Abstract. We study the necessary and sufficient assumptions for universally composable (UC) computation, both in terms of setup and computational assumptions. We look at the common reference string model, the uniform random string model and the key-registration authority model (KRA), and provide new results for all of them. Perhaps most interestingly we show that:
Introduction
We study the necessary and sufficient assumptions for universally composable (UC) computation [Can01] , both in terms of which setup models are needed and how strong assumptions on the setup are needed, and in terms of necessary and sufficient computational assumptions.
One of the motivation is to study the minimal setup required for UC computation. It is known that some kind of setup is required, which makes it a theoretically interesting question exactly how strong an assumption must be made on the setup. We study both the common reference string model (CRS) and the key registration authority model (KRA), and some variations.
The goal of the study is also to determine the relationships between one way functions (OWF), passive secure stand-alone oblivious transfer (SA-OT) 1 , UC commitments (UC-Com) and UC oblivious transfer (UC-OT) in different set-up models 2 : for stand-alone security, we know that OWF are sufficient for other cryptographic tasks such as commitments and zero-knowledge proofs. Are OWF equivalent to any of these tasks when it comes to UC security? For the CRS models, Damgård and Groth [DG03] answered the question negatively showing that UC-Com implies key agreement in the CRS models and therefore, given the black-box separation between OWF and key agreement [IR89, RTV04] , OWF are not sufficient to realize UC-Com. We find it interesting to study if this is inherent or associated to the particular setup model. We include SA-OT because it is complete for stand alone computation [Kil88] , and therefore a natural question is whether SA-OT is sufficient also for UC computation. On the other hand it is interesting to know whether this assumption is minimal, i.e. whether SA-OT is also necessary to implement UC-Com and UC-OT. The motivation for including UC-OT is that it is complete for general UC computation: it is possible to implement any well-formed ideal functionality given the UC-OT functionality, see [CLOS02, IPS08] . Finally the motivation for including UC-Com is that it is potentially weaker than UC-OT but still implies a number of non-trivial tasks like coin-flip and zero-knowledge.
Highlights. We highlight some of the new findings which we find particularly interesting: In the KRA model, we provide the first construction of UC commitment from one-way functions-all previous constructions, to the best of our knowledge, used special assumptions or assumed at least public-key encryption. A consequence of it is that zero-knowledge and coin-flip can be UC securely implemented in Minicrypt. Until now it was not known if any non-trivial UC computation was possible in Minicrypt.
Remembering that UC-Com implies SA-OT in the CRS models we get another new result: The choice of the setup model can make a difference in which ideal functionalities can be implemented under a given computational assumption. In the CRS model we need SA-OT for UC-Com, but in the KRA model we can do with just OWF. This seems to be the first such separation of the setup models.
It turns out that SA-OT is sufficient for UC-OT in any setup model we considered, in particular in the minimal version of both the CRS and KRA model. Since some setup assumption is needed for general UC computation, this seems a very positive addition to the UC theory: Some setup is needed, but even the most trivial setup will allow to implement any well-formed functionality.
Finally, we show how to implement authenticated channels given a minimal meaningful KRA: Implementing authentication in a public-key setting is of course trivial if one can choose the structure of the public keys-one includes a verification key in the public key and signs all messages. It is by far trivial in our relaxed KRA model as we make no assumption on the public keys except that they are in the range of some one-way function, which might itself be maliciously chosen. Standard constructions of signature schemes from one-way functions use verification keys with much more structure than this. This seems to be the first result which shows that any value you could hope for to act as a public key can actually be used to implement an authenticated channel.
Setup models: We look at five setup models: -In the uniform common random string (U-CRS) model we assume that a single uniformly random ℓ-bit string is chosen by a trusted party and made public. Here ℓ is chosen by the protocol. -In the chosen common reference string (C-CRS) model the trusted party samples using a poly-time one-way 3 distribution ∶ {0, 1} → {0, 1} ℓ , which allows to have a particular form. We assume that the trusted party samples a single = ( ) for uniformly random ∈ {0, 1} and makes public. The function might be given by the protocol .
-The any common reference string (A-CRS) model is like the C-CRS model,
except that we let the adversary pick , under the only restriction that is one-way. The trusted party samples = ( ) and makes ( , ) public.
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-In the chosen key registration authority (C-KRA) model we assume that the protocol contains a poly-time function for each party . A trusted party will sample = ( ) for each and give to and to all other parties. This models a key-registration authority with public keys , secret keys and where the parties are guaranteed to know their secret keys.
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-The any key registration authority (A-KRA) model is like the C-KRA model, except that we allow the adversary to specify each , under the only restriction that is a one-way function when is honest.
In the CRS models we in addition assume the presence of authenticated channels, as the existence of a CRS clearly does not allow authentication: All parties know the CRS and nothing else, so nothing distinguishes an honest party from the adversary. In the KRA models we start from the unauthenticated channels model, as the existence of a public-key infrastructure has the potential to allow authentication. In the A-CRS model the protocol does not choose , and the security of should hold for any one-way function . Another way of phrasing the model is to say that the protocol , parametrized by , should be secure in the C-CRS model for any one-way function . In some sense this models the minimal meaningful common random string: we do not make assumptions on how random it is, but the parties can agree on the fact that there is something about the string which neither of them knows.
3 If is invertible then the C-CRS and the U-CRS model are trivially equivalent. 4 Note that the A-CRS model generalizes both the U-CRS and the C-CRS, for computational security: the U-CRS is computationally indistinguishable from a setup where the trusted party picks a random seed and expands it using a pseudo random generator. 5 This is essentially the key registration with knowledge (KRK) model from [BCNP04] .
We cannot start from the KR model from [BCNP04] as we need that parties know their secret keys to implemented authenticated channels.
The A-KRA model in some sense is the minimal meaningful assumption on a key registration authority: Each party has a publicly known public key and there is some secret about which only knows. A protocol for the A-KRA can therefore be run given any meaningful key registration authority, with no assumption whatsoever about the form of or the exact hardness of finding . Note that one can think of simpler public key models, as the bare public key model (BPK) introduced in [CGGM00] , that does not require corrupted parties to know their secret keys. However, even if the BPK model has been successfully used to break some impossibility results about concurrent ZK (see [OPV08] and reference therein), it was shown in [KL07] that UC computation is impossible even in the BPK model or any other public key model "without knowledge".
Results: Let 1 , 2 ∈ { OWF, SA-OT, UC-Com, UC-OT } and one of the described setup model. Then we can ask ourselves questions of the form "is 1 necessary/sufficient for 2 in the model?" Some of these are of course trivial, like is OWF necessary for UC-OT in the U-CRS model?, but many are non-trivial and theoretically interesting, like is SA-OT sufficient for UC-OT in the A-CRS model?. The answers to these questions are pictorially illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . The main results are proved through the text while the implications that were already known, or that easily follow from our results and known facts are presented in Sec. 8. 
U-CRS, A-CRS
When SA-OT appears on the left side of the implication, the assumption is that there exist a protocol that implement SA-OT in the stand alone mode. When UC-Com and UC-OT appear on the left side of the implication, the assumption is that there exist a protocol that implement that functionality in the model in question, i.e., we are not referring to an hybrid world where the functionality is given to the party: We assume that the parties know a protocol to implement the functionality.
Note that the figure states that UC-Com is not sufficient for UC-OT in the C-KRA model, while the answer is yes in the A-KRA model. This may seem surprising because the C-KRA model (unlike A-KRA) allows the protocol to choose how public keys are computed and so it seems that anything that is possible in the A-KRA model should also possible in C-KRA. The catch is that the UC-Com assumption is not the same in the two models, in particular, having a UC-commitment scheme that works in the A-KRA model is a much stronger tool than one that needs C-KRA.
For all our negative answers to sufficient questions and positive answers to necessary questions, we mean that there is no black-box construction. We cannot answer whether OWF is sufficient for UC-Com with our current understanding of complexity theory: It might be that one-way functions do not exists, in which case the assumption OWF is false, and then OWF ⇒ UC-Com is true. The
UC − OT therefore means that there is no black-box construction which takes an implementation of UC commitment for the C-KRA model and gives an implementation of UC OT for the C-KRA model. For some of our positive answers to sufficient questions and negative answers to necessary questions, we appeal to non-black box constructions. As an example, the result
UC − Com uses a description of the circuit for the OWF.
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Related work. In [CLOS02] the main feasibility result for UC computation in the CRS model can be found. [CLOS02] needs to assume enhanced trapdoor permutation in order to achieve their results, while we use the strictly weaker assumption SA-OT. On the other hand this comparison is not quite fair as [CLOS02] tries to achieve adaptive security, and consider static security just as a special case, while our focus is entirely on static security. In a recent series of papers [PR08, MPR09] , the classification of the cryptographic complexity of UC functionalities is studied. Perhaps most interestingly with respect to our work, in [MPR09] it is shown the SA-OT assumption is equivalent to any UC functionality being either trivial or complete. There is a clear overlap between these results and some of ours, however we focus on setup functionalities -that are invoked just once at the beginning of the protocol, while 6 It might be possible that ⇏ and ⇒ at the same time. However, if for any of the ⇏ separations in Figure 1 , 2 this is the case, then one would have a non-blackbox construction of SA-OT using OWF. Such a construction is unlikely to exist -or at least requires completely new cryptographic techniques -see also [RTV04] .
the constructions in [MPR09] use the ideal functionalities during the protocol in an on-line fashion.
The KRA Model
In this section we give our model of minimal public-key setup, where each party knows a secret which is not known by the other parties. We associate these secrets to public values which we distribute via a key generator . When sampled it outputs (( 1 , 1 ) We introduce some convenient notation for the case where all public keys are generated using the same function . For a function ∶ {0, 1} → {0, 1} ℓ we define the key generator as follows: For each honest party it samples ∈ {0, 1} and computes = ( ). Then it outputs { } ∈[ ]∖ to the adviser. It interprets the next message from the adviser as a set { } ∈ and computes = ( ) for ∈ . It defines by ( , ) ∈ iff = ( ) and then outputs ( ( 1 , 1 , ) , . . . , ( , , )).
-Let be the number of parties and the set of corrupted parties, and run ( , ) with the UC adversary A as adviser.
-When ( , ) outputs ( , 1 , . . . , ), then send ( , { } ∈ ) to A and send ( , ) to each , letting A determine the delivery time. (Fig. 3) 3 Authentication in the A-KRA Model given OWF We show here how to implement authentication with any meaningful KRA. We first construct a system for identification secure under concurrent composition, using -protocols in a more or less standard manner. Then we extend this identification system to a UC secure authentication system in a novel manner.
Implementing authentication in a public-key setting is of course trivial if one can choose the structure of the public keys-one includes a verification key in the public key and signs all messages. It is by far trivial in our relaxed KRA model as we make no assumption on the public keys except that they are in the range of some one-way function, which might itself be maliciously chosen. Standard constructions of signature schemes from one-way functions use verification keys with much more structure than this.
-Protocols
For details on the following brief introduction see [CDS94] . Let ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1}
* be a binary relation. A -protocol for consists of ( , , , , , ), where is a poly-time algorithm which for all ( , ) ∈ and sufficiently long randomness outputs a commit message = ( , , ); = {0, 1}
ℓ is a set of challenges; is a poly-time algorithm which given ( , ) ∈ and ∈ and randomness outputs a reply = ( , , , ); is a poly-time algorithm, called the judgment, which given any ( , , , ) outputs ( , , , ) ∈ {accept, reject}; and is a poly-time algorithm called the witness extractor and is a PPT algorithm called the simulator. Furthermore: completeness: For all ( , ) ∈ , all randomness and = ( , , ) and = ( , , , ) it holds that ( , , , ) = accept. special soundness: For all ( , , , ) and ( , ,
and all ∈ the simulator outputs ( , ) ← ( , ) such that ( , , , ) = accept and such that the distribution of ( , , , ) is computationally indistinguishable from ( , ( , , ), , ( , , , )) for a uniformly random . This holds even when the distinguisher is given .
One round of the standard zero-knowledge protocol for Hamiltonian Cycle using a statistically binding commitment scheme is a -protocol for Hamiltonian Cycle with = {0, 1}. Since -protocols are closed under parallel composition, this gives a -protocol for any NP relation based on one-way function, with = {0, 1} ℓ for any polynomial ℓ.
The OR-Construction
Let 0 and 1 be binary relations and define
) be a -protocol for 1 with the same challenge space as 0 . We construct a -protocol, = 0 ∨ 1 , for as follows:
-The commit message = ( , 0 , ) is computed as follows given 0 : Let ( 0 , 1 ) = , compute 0 = 0 ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) for uniformly random 0 , sample a uniformly random 1 ∈ and sample
, where is the randomness used to sample 1 . Similarly with 1 , with all indices swapped. -The verifier sends the prover a challenge from the challenge space .
-The reply = ( , 0 , , ) is computed as follows: Let 0 = ⊕ 1 . Let
-The simulator ( , ) ← ( , ) works as follows: Sample 0 ∈ uniformly at random and let 1 = ⊕ 0 . (Equivalently, sample 1 ∈ uniformly at random and
It is straight-forward to verifiy that 0 ∨ 1 is a -protocol for 0 ∨ 1 . Then the OR-construction is witness indistinguishable in the following sense: Consider a PPT adversary A. Give it ( , ( 0 , 1 )) and give it access to a proof oracle O , which on input prv picks a fresh identifier , samples ( ) ← ( , , ), stores the prover intermediate state ( ) = ( , , ) and returns
To see that it is witness-hiding, consider the game with oracles O 0 and O 1 and consider the hybrid oracle O 1 2 which computes the proofs as follows: The commit message = ( , 0 ; ) is computed as follows: Let ( 0 , 1 ) = , compute 0 = 0 ( 0 , 0 ; 0 ) for uniformly random 0 and 1 = 1 ( 1 , 1 ; 1 ) for uniformly random 1 . Let = ( 0 , 1 ). The reply = ( , 0 , , ) is computed as follows: Sample 1 ∈ uniformly at random and let
It is easy to see that the probability that A O 0 ( , ( 0 , 1 )) outputs 0 is negligible close to the probability that
). In the same way it follows that the probability that A O 1 ( , ( 0 , 1 )) outputs 0 is negligible close to the probability
Hard Double-Witness Generator
We call a hard double-witness generator for = 0 ∨ 1 if it is PPT and a random sample ( , 0 , 1 ) ← has the property that ( , 0 ) ∈ and ( , 1 ) ∈ and that it is hard to compute 0 from ( , 1 ) and hard to compute 1 from ( , 0 ), i.e., a PPT algorithm given a random ( , ) outputs ( , 1− ) with negligible probability. If is a hard double-witness generator for = 0 ∨ 1 , then = 0 ∨ 1 is witness hiding for , i.e., an adversary cannot compute a witness after seeing any number of proofs. Since -protocol are proofs of knowledge, the adversary cannot give a proof without knowing the witness. Putting these two observations together we get that the adversary cannot give a proof for a statement even after seeing any number of proofs for , in the following sense: We say that A wins the reprove game in Fig. 4 if at the end of the game there is a stored value ( , , ) (from reply verifier), where ( , , , ) = accept and where A did not challenge a prover (in reply verifier) between receiving and returning . I.e., A did not challenge a prover while it had to compute its own challenge.
initialize Let = 0. Sample ( , 0 , 1 ) ← and give to A. start prover Whenever A inputs (prv, ), let = +1, sample ( ) ← ( , , ), store the prover intermediate state
and some
, ) and return ( ) to A. start verifier On input (verify, ) from A, sample a uniformly random ∈ , store ( , ) and return to A. reply verifier On input (reply, , , ) from A, where ( , ) is stored, delete ( , ) and store ( , , ). The intuition behind the proof is that an adversary A which wins the game can be used to extract a witness by rewinding the winning conversation and sending a new challenge, to get two valid conversations. Since A did not challenge a prover between getting and sending its reply, the rewinding does not give problems. Which of the two witnesses 0 and 1 is extracted by A does not change significantly if we give all the proofs to A using a random fixed witness instead of letting A choose from proof to proof: If it did, it would clearly allow us to break witness indistinguishability. So, with a non-negligible probability A computes the witness not used to give the proofs. This allows to break . (Full proof in Appendix A.)
Authentication
We now turn our focus to authentication. Given that we are in the A-KRA model, the sender knows a secret for his public key s.t. ( , ) ∈ for some poly-time relation . In the same way, the receiver knows s.t. ( , ) ∈ . Construct a −protocol = 0 ∨ 1 for the relation = ∨ , i.e. the verifier accepts if the prover knows a secret key for or for . Now the parties can identify to each other using this −protocol.
The way we build an authenticated channel from this identification protocol is as follows: wants to send a message ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , where ℓ is a fixed message length. We essentially let the receiver simulate a clock by identifying towards the sender ℓ times. In each "time period" the sender will then either identify itself or not. This defines the ℓ bits of the message. At the end the sender does a number of identifications to bring up the total number of identifications given by the sender to ℓ. The receiver will accept only if it sees a total of ℓ identifications. This is done to make it impossible for an adversary to drop identifications from the sender to the receiver. At the end, we add two last rounds where identify to and then identifies to . This is to inform the other party that the message was accepted.
For
is the -th bit of . Note that
, that ( ) contains exactly ℓ + 1 symbols of each type, and that the last symbols are always S R. These are sufficient properties for the protocol to be secure. The protocol is given in Fig. 5. setup: Sender knows , , and and receiver knows , , and such that ( , ) ∈ and ( , ) ∈ . sender: The first time gets an input ∈ {0, 1} ℓ it computes = ( ), sends to and runs the following: 1. Let = 1.
If
= S, then instantiate a prover = (( , ), ) and let it interact with . 3. If = R, then instantiate a verifier = ( , ) and let it interact with . If rejects, then terminate the protocol with output reject. 4. When the above instance closes (either or ), then let = + 1. If ≤ 2ℓ + 2, then go to Step 2. If > 2ℓ + 2, then output accept. receiver: The first time receives ∈ {0, 1} ℓ from it computes = ( ) and runs the following:
and let it interact with . 3. If = S, then instantiate a verifier = ( , ) and let it interact with . If rejects, then terminate the protocol with output reject. 4. When the above instance closes (either or ), then let = + 1. If ≤ 2ℓ + 2, then go to Step 2. If > 2ℓ + 2, then output (accept, ). The intuition is as follows: For = 1, . . . , 2ℓ + 2 we match the 'th instance run by to the 'th instance run by . If and open a prover respectively a verifier, or a verifier respectively a prover, then they might both continue to + 1 without rejecting.
If and both open a verifier, then one of them will be terminated without a prover were running. Therefore this verifier will reject (by Thm. 1), which makes the party running that verifier reject. If and both instantiate a prover, then one of these provers will close without a verifier having been running at the other party.
Wlog, say that a prover was running at while no verifier was running at (one can repeat the argument switching the role of and ). This prover will not make any verifier accept at , therefore will run more provers than the number of accepting verifiers that runs. Since starts ℓ + 1 provers, by construction of , it follows that sees at most ℓ accepting verifiers. Therefore will not output accept. It follows that if and have different , then one of them does not output accept. In other words, if both parties output accept, then they saw the same message , as is a unique encoding of .
Second, assume that did not accept. This implies that rejected when < 2ℓ + 2 or at least never reached = 2ℓ + 2, as 2ℓ+2 = R implies that cannot reject while = 2ℓ + 2. Therefore ran at most ℓ provers and thus saw at most ℓ verifiers accept. Therefore did not accept either. In other words, if accepts, then accepts. Putting these two observations together, we conclude that if accepts, then both parties accept, and then and saw the same message , as desired. (Full proof in Appendix B.) This symmetric guarantee makes the protocol suitable also to authenticate messages from to , and we will use this property in Thm. 3.
init: First it lets init = 1 for all , and then it runs F kra with adversary A, to generate ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) , . . . , ( , , ). init done: If the adversary inputs (done, ) at a point where init = 1 and after F kra terminated, then output ( , ) to , where = (( 1, 1) , . . . , ( , )), and set init = 0. authenticated transfer, send: On input ( , ) from where init = 0, store ( , , ) and output ( , , ) to the adversary. authenticated transfer, receive: On input ( , , ) from the adversary, if ( , , ) was previously stored, wait until init = 0 and then output ( , ) to . 
Multiparty Authentication
Our ideal functionality for authenticated transmission is given in Fig. 6 . We have it do a key setup as F kra and output the generated keys before the authenticated transfer phase begins. This is for compositional reasons-it allows outer protocols to use the same secrets, which we exploit in later sections. Here we focus on the phase after the keys are generated: The functionality allows to deliver only messages which were actually sent, which models authentication. It can deliver a message several times and reorder them. This can be handled outside F mau using e.g. sequence numbers. Any message sent is leaked to the adversary to model that the transmission is only authenticated, not private. Our implementation of F mau runs in the F kra hybrid model, see Fig. 7 .
setup: When party receives ( , ) from F kra , it parses as (( 1 , 1 ) , . . . , ( , ) The proof is essentially a reduction to Thm. 2. If mau is not secure it is possible to make an honest output ( , ) for an honest without giving input ( , ) to . We can reduce that to an attack on the protocol in Fig. 5 . First of all, we can assume that all other parties than and are corrupted, as this can only help the adversary. Then, whenever or have to interact with any ∈ { , }, they run the protocol honestly, but use the secret of as witness. By witness indistinguishability (WI) this changes the probability that outputs ( , ) without having received input ( , ) at most negligibly. But now all interaction involving other parties than and can be run by the adversary in its head, as it knows for all corrupted parties-whatever messages would send to can be computed using . But this modified adversary is carrying out an attack on Fig. 7 with = 2. This is essentially an attack on Fig. 5 . The only difference is that in Fig. 7 , during KRA propagation, the environment gets and from , . This happens after the protocol , was run, and therefore it is not needed to run the adversary against 4 UC-OT in the A-KRA Model given SA-OT Suppose we are given an UC commitment functionality, F mcom as defined in [CF01] : then we can implement UC zero-knowledge, F mzk , for all NP relations, which in turn allows us to implement a static, active UC secure OT from the passive secure OT. We can therefore focus on implementing F mcom using SA-OT.
The main idea of the protocol in Fig. 8 is to "compile" the SA-OT into a UC-OT using the WI proof for statements of the kind "I followed to protocol or I know your secret key".
The following describes a commitment to from party to party . In the full protocol different instances use session identifiers to separate executions. Here commit(⋅) is a statistically binding commitment.
1. All communication is authenticated using F mau . Use sequence numbers to guarantee that no identical messages are ever sent, and thus never accept the same message twice from any party. 2.
samples a uniformly random string and sends ← commit( ) to . 3. samples a uniformly random string , sets 0 = 1 , sets 1 = and sends ← commit( ), 0 ← commit( 0 ) and 1 ← commit( 1 ) to . 4. Then and run the SA-OT, where takes inputs 0 and 1 and uses randomness while gives input = 0 and uses randomness . After sending each message in the SA-OT shows that it knows an opening of to such that the message it sent is consistent with having run the SA-OT with randomness , selection bit = 0 and the messages received from so far. After sending each message in the SA-OT shows that it knows an opening of , 0 and 1 to , 0 respectively 1 such that the messages it sent are consistent with the execution of the SA-OT with randomness , inputs 0 , 1 and the messages received from . The proofs are given via a -protocol for NP and use the OR-construction to prove either knowledge of the openings mentioned above or the secret of the other party. 5. To open sends to and shows that is the message inside 1 or that knows such that ( , ) ∈ . The proof is given using two -protocols and the OR-construction. The simulator extracts a commitment from a corrupted sender * to an honest receiver by using selection bit = 1 to learn from the SA-OT. If the sender manages to send ′ ≠ in the opening phase for some commitment, we can extract the proofs in the SA-OT for this commitment and learn a secret ′ for 's public key . Since never uses in the protocol, this contradicts the hardness of computing a witness for . To be able to use selection bit = 1, the simulator gives the proof in the run of the SA-OT using the secret ′ of the sender. This goes unnoticed by the computational hiding of the commitment scheme, the computational hiding of the SA-OT and the WI of the OR-construction. To trapdoor open a commitment to some ′ the simulator simply sends ′ and simulates the proof that this is the correct message, by using the secret of the receiver as witness. This goes unnoticed as for = 1. Proof: By Thm. 4 we can implement F mcom in the F mau -hybrid model, which implies that we can implement any well-formed F in the F mau -hybrid model, if there exists a passive secure SA-OT protocol. By Thm. 3 we can implement F mau in the unauthenticated F kra -hybrid model for any meaningful . It then follows from the UC composition theorem that we can implement any well-formed F in the unauthenticated F kra -hybrid model for any meaningful , if there exists a passive secure SA-OT protocol. ◻
UC Commitment in the C-KRA Model given OWFs
In a nutshell, to construct UC-Com in the C-KRA model, we let the public keys to be commitments of the secret keys. Then to commit the sender send an encryption of the message under his secret key. To open, he sends the message together with a WI proof for a statement " is the committed message or I know your secret key".
Theorem 5. If one-way functions exist, then there exists a UC commitment scheme for the C-KRA model secure against a static, active adversary.
Proof: The public key is an unconditionally binding commitment = commit( ; ) to a uniformly random value ∈ {0, 1} . Let {0,1} ∶ {0, 1} 2 → {0, 1} 2 be a pseudo-random permutation (PRP). Both can be instantiated using one-way functions.
To commit to ∈ {0, 1} with session identifier ∈ {0, 1} towards , sends = ( ). To open the commitment to , the sender sends and gives a proof that it knows and such that " = commit( ; ) ∨ ( = commit( ; ) ∧ = ( ))". The proof is given using two -protocols combined with the OR-construction.
To extract, the simulator computes = −1 ( ), where is found as part of the secret = ( , ) of the sender . By binding the sender to unconditionally and the soundness of the proof and the fact that the sender cannot open the commitment , this will yield the only that the sender can open the commitment to later.
To equivocate the simulator sends a uniformly random . When given it sends and gives the proof using the secret of the receiver as witness. By computational hiding of the commitment scheme, pseudo-randomness of and WI of the proof, this will go unnoticed. ◻
UC OT in the A-CRS Model given SA-OT
Here we implement UC OT from SA-OT in any CRS model. We prove it for the A-CRS model, and hence for the U-CRS and C-CRS models too. We already know how to do UC OT in the A-KRA model given SA-OT, so it is sufficient to implement F kra in the F crs for any meaningful and all one-way .
The protocol runs in the F crs -hybrid model.
-All parties receive ( , ) from F crs . -Each samples = ( ) for a uniformly random and sends to all parties. All parties resend the received value to all parties. -Then in round-robin, for = 1, . . . , , each proves knowledge of to all other parties. It does this in round robin, for = 1, . . . , . With each it runs the proof as in Fig. 8 : It inputs 0 = 0 and 1 = to the SA-OT and inputs = 0. During the run of the SA-OT, proves that either 1) its messages are consistent with a run of the SA-OT protocol and = ( 1) or 2) its messages are consistent with a run of the SA-OT protocol and = ( 1). Party proves that either 1) its messages are consistent with a run of the SA-OT protocol with = 0 or 2) it knows such that = ( ). The proofs are given via a -protocol for NP and the OR-construction. When and are done, they both send done to the other parties. Parties only begin their proof when they received done from all previous pairs.
-If and when a party received from F crs , a value from each and a resent value ′ from all other parties with ′ = , and saw an accepting proof from each , it outputs (( 1, ), . . . , ( , )), . Fig. 9 is a UC secure implementation of F kra in the F crs -hybrid model against a static, active adversary.
Theorem 6. If is OWF, then is meaningful, and if the used OT protocol is a SA-OT, then kra in
The proof is very similar to the proof of Thm. 4. The simulator extracts the secret of corrupted parties using selection bit = 1. It simulates proofs using the secret of . We run the proofs in round-robin to ensure that the simulator will not give a simulated proof (using ) while a corrupted party has to give a proof. If it did so, we could not show that a corrupted party cannot give an acceptable proof unless it used 1 such that = 
Proof:
We show how a UC secure commitment scheme for the A-KRA model can be turned into a SA-OT. Note that this UC-Com protocol needs to work for any KRA, so we can choose a special KRA that it's possible to "simulate" in some sense without using any setup assumptions.
To simplify the proof, consider the AND primitive, where inputs ∈ {0, 1} and inputs a bit ∈ {0, 1} and where has no output and gets output = . It is well-known that if there exists passive, stand-alone secure AND (SA-AND), then there also exist SA-OT. Then it is sufficient to show how to implement SA-AND from UC-Com in the A-KRA model.
The existence of UC-Com clearly implies OWFs, so we can assume that we have a PRG ∶ {0, 1} → {0, 1}
+1 . Consider the key generator , where
. This is clearly a meaningful generator, as a PRG ∶ {0, 1} → {0, 1}
+1 is one-way. From the assumption that there exist UC-Com in the A-KRA model, we have a protocol which UC implements F mcom in the F kra -hybrid model with sender and receiver . The sender gets key material ( , ) and and the receiver gets key material and ( , ). Here = ( ) for = , . Consider the following adversary A against for the case when the sender is corrupted: It samples uniformly random ∈ {0, 1}, ∈ {0, 1} and 1− ∈ {0, 1} and lets = ( ) and
Then it commits to some ∈ {0, 1} by honestly running the commitment phase of the protocol with key material ( , ) and , where = ( , , 1− ). It's clear here that ≠ ′ as the first bit is different, and ( ) = ( ′ ). Later it decommits by honestly running the opening phase of the protocol . Lemma 1. When running with A, the honest receiver will accept the commitment and will later accept the opening to , except with negligible probability.
The proof follows from the fact that cannot distinguish A from the honest sender (Full proof in Appendix C.). By being UC secure, and the above lemma, it follows that there exists a UC simulator S which can extract from the conversation with A already in the commitment phase. Since S is simulating F kra to A, it follows that S learns ′ and chooses the value of . Consider then the SA-AND in Fig. 10 . If = 1, then all values are distributed as in the simulation of with A and S, so computes , except with negligible probability. This established the correctness, hence it only remains to prove the following lemma. inputs by committing to = by honestly running the commitment phase of , playing the role of the sender with key material ( , ) and . If = 1, then runs S to extract from the conversation with , and outputs . If = 0, then honestly runs the commitment phase of , playing the role of the receiver with key material ( , ) and , and outputs 0. 
Conclusions
Combining our findings with some previous results it is possible to fill the rows of Table 8 . We will make use of the following:
Theorem 8. [IR89] There is no black-box construction of SA-OT from OWF.

Theorem 9. [IR89] There is no black-box construction of key-agreement (KA) from OWF.
Theorem 10. [DG03] UC-Com in the U/A-CRS model implies SA-OT.
Theorem 11. [DG03] UC-Com in the C-CRS model implies KA.
The answer to (a) follows directly from Thm. 11 and Thm. 9 for the CRS models; in the same way it follows from (j) and Thm. 8 for the A-KRA model; (b) is shown in Thm. 5; (c) follows from Thm. 9 and the fact that UC-OT in any model implies KA; the answer to (d) is built from the fact that UC-Com in those models implies SA-OT (see (j)), and that we can compile this into a UC-OT using the UC-Com, as it implies UC-ZK; the answer to (f) goes as follows: (m) tells us that UC-OT in the C-KRA model implies SA-OT while (b) tells us that OWF are sufficient for UC-OT in the C-KRA model. Therefore UC-Com is not sufficient for UC-OT, or we will get a contradiction with Thm. 8; (g) is proved in Thm. 4 and 6; (h) is trivial as OWF are minimal for cryptography, and (i) is trivial as UC-OT is complete for UC computation; (j) is proved in Thm. 7 and 10; (l) follows from (b) and Thm. 8; finally (m) follows from the following observation: semi-honest parties can efficiently simulate the U-CRS (or the A-CRS) setup model by letting one party pick a random string without learning the trapdoor and make the public. Then the parties will run the UC-OT protocol using this string as the CRS, therefore achieving a SA-OT. As for the C-KRA (or the A-KRA) models, they can be efficiently simulated by letting every party generate his own public/secret key pair and sending the public key to all other parties. Now the parties can run the UC-OT using those public keys, and they'll achieve a SA-OT.
The C-CRS setup assumption
In this section we discuss the C-CRS model, and the open questions (e), (k) and (n) left in the table. Consider (n): is SA-OT necessary for UC-OT in the C-CRS model? The way we positively answered the question for the other setup models is by letting one party honestly pick a random CRS and publish it, therefore simulating the setup model. We don't know how to do it in the C-CRS model: in fact, we don't know whether it is possible, for any chosen OWF , to sample an image = ( ) without learning the pre-image . For instance, if ∈ ℤ and ( ) = ( , ℎ ) for , ℎ elements in group of large prime order , then it is believed that one cannot sample from the image of without learning , to the extent that people construct protocols based on this belief (the so-called knowledge of exponent assumption [Dam91] ). This suggests very strongly that the open questions cannot be solved using the techniques we have used here. It could of course be possible to approach (n) in some other way. It seems counter-intuitive to think that it would be possible to implement UC-OT in a world where SA-OT does not exist: how much power does a symmetric setup as the C-CRS give to the parties? However, if it turns out that the answer to (n) is affirmative, then we could use (g) to turn any UC-OT in the C-CRS model into a UC-OT in the U/A-CRS model, and this would also be a surprising result. Similar considerations can be made for (e) and (k).
A Proof of Thm. 1
The theorem follows directly from the following five lemmas.
Let Game 0 denote the reprove game in Fig. 4 and let Success 0 (A) denote the probability that A wins it. Let Game 1 be the reprove game in Fig. 4 , but where we restrict the adversary A ′ to use each of the commands start verifier and reply verifier at most once. Let Success 1 (A ′ ) denote the probability that such A ′ wins this alternative reprove game.
Lemma 3. For all PPT adversaries A for Game 0 there exists a PPT adversary
A ′ for Game 1 such that Success 1 (A ′ ) − Success 0 (A) ( ) is negligible,
for a polynomial ( ).
Proof: Let ( ) be a polynomial upper bound on the number of verifiers started by A. The adversary A ′ samples a uniformly random ∈ [ ( )]. It then runs as A, except that when A outputs (verify, ), then A ′ samples a uniformly random ∈ , stores ( , ) and returns to A. When A outputs (reply, , , ) and some ( , ) is stored, delete ( , ) and store ( , , ). All verifiers are handled like this one, except that when A outputs (verify, ) for the 'th time, then A ′ outputs (verify, ) too, and when A outputs (reply, , , ), then A outputs (reply, ). It is clear that A ′ wins if A would have won because the 'th conversation ( , , ) fulfilled the winning condition, which proves the lemma. ◻ initialize Let = 0 and phase = proof. Sample ( , 0 , 1 ) ← and give to A. start prover Whenever A inputs (prv, ) and phase = proof, let = +1, sample ( ) ← ( , , ), store the prover intermediary state ( ) = ( , , ) and return ( ) to A. challenge prover Whenever A inputs (chl, , ( ) ) and phase = proof and some ( ) = ( , , ) is stored, delete ( ) , compute = ( , , ( ) , ) and return ( ) to A. start verifier On input (verify, ) from A when phase = proof, set phase = verify and return a uniformly random ∈ to A. reply verifier On input (reply, ) from A when phase = verify, the game proceeds as follows: If ( , , , ) = accept for the and from start verifier, then A wins the game, otherwise it loses. If A terminates before the reply verifier phase it also loses. Consider Game 2, defined as Game 1, except that A is not allowed to start or challenge a prover after receiving the in the start verifier command-see Fig. 11 for details. Let Success 2 (A) denote the probability that A wins Game 2.
Lemma 4. For all PPT adversaries A for Game 1 there exists a PPT adversary
Proof: Let A be an adversary winning Game 1 with probability Success 1 (A).
Since A (by definition of Game 1) only calls start verifier and reply verifier once, and since A (by definition of the reprove game) does not win if it challenges a prover between receiving its own challenge in start verifier and returning its reply in reply verifier, we can assume that A does not challenge any provers between using the start verifier and reply verifier commands. After it uses the reply verifier command, it is already determined if it wins or not, so we can in fact assume that A does not challenge any provers after using the start verifier commands. Now let adversary A ′ run A, except that when phase = verify and A outputs (prv, ), then A ′ samples ( * , * ) ← ( , ) for = 0 ℓ and returns * to A-here is the simulator of the -protocol. Since A never asks to challenge this prover, it is not a problem that A ′ only can reply to = 0 ℓ . If using simulated values would noticeably change the probability with which A wins, then it can distinguish simulated values from real ones, which would contradict honest verifier zero-knowledge. ◻ Consider now Game 3, defined as Game 2, except that A wins iff it outputs such that ( , ) ∈ .
Lemma 5. For all PPT adversaries A for Game 2 there exists a PPT adversary
Proof: Since A is for Game 2, it does not start or challenge any provers after using the start verifier command. This means, the end of the game is of the form: A sends (verify, ) to the game, gets back and then returns (reply, ). This allows A ′ to run and rewind A and extract a witness when it wins: It rewinds A to the point where it got and reruns with a new uniformly random ′ . If A wins again and
as the witness for . An application of Jensen's inequality shows that if A wins with probability , then A ′ wins with probability ≥ 2 − 2 −ℓ , where −2 −ℓ comes from the fact that ′ = with probability 2 −ℓ . ◻ Consider Game 4, defined as Game 3, except that A before it starts any verifiers must specify a bit * ∈ {0, 1}. Then it is only allowed to use = 1 − * when it starts a prover, and it only wins if it outputs * . Proof: Given any A for Game 4, consider the following attack contradicting that is a hard double-witness generator: Run A to get * and output 1 − * to get ( , 1− * ) sampled by . Then use and 1− * to run A in Game 4. If A wins Game 4, then let * be the witness produced by A, and output * to win the game against . ◻
Proof: If accepts, then
( ) = for = 1, . . . , ℓ + 1, (except with negligible probability) This means that ran ℓ + 1 provers. Since 2ℓ+2 = R and contains exactly ℓ + 1 positions with = R, it follows that reached = 2ℓ + 2 and that at this iteration it ran a prover, called (ℓ+2) . By definition of ( ) it follows that (ℓ+2) was challenged before (ℓ+2) received its reply message. Given that accepts, (ℓ+2) did receive a reply message, and therefore (ℓ+2) did receive its challenge, making (ℓ+2) accept and therefore making output accept. ◻
C Proofs
Proof of Thm. 3: The simulator S simply runs the protocol honestly with A: First it runs F kra with A and distributes the keys as specified. It records the secrets of all parties. Then, when it receives ( , , ) from F mau , it runs from mau with input ( , ). If an honest in the simulated run of mau outputs ( ,
This gives a perfect simulation unless S at some point inputs ( , , ′ ) to F mau without party on F mau having received input ( , ′ ). Since inputting ( , ′ ) to party on F mau is the only way for S to receive ( , , ′ ) from F mau , which is in turn the only way S will send = sig ( ′ ), it follows that the simulation is perfect unless it happens that an honest receives ( , , ′ , ) with ver ′ ( ′ , ) = accept without S having sent = sig ( ′ ), we can focus on proving that this happens with negligible probability.
Let A (and Z) be any PPT adversary (and environment) which makes an honest receive ( , , ′ , ) with ver ′ ( ′ , ) = accept for an honest without S having sent = sig ( ′ ). Say this happens with probability . We show that is negligible.
Suppose A breaks the protocol by guessing and uniformly at random before running the attack. Then we can turn A into an adversary A ′ which first fixes and and then makes output ( , ) without giving the input ( , ) to . It will succeed with probability at least ′ = 2 . We then change the protocol as follows: For each with ≠ and ≠ we make the following change: In key authentication we let and run the protocol , = au (( , ), , ) (or , if < ) with the cheat that in all proofs from to we let use the witness , and we let and run the protocol , = au (( , ), , ) (or , if < ) with the cheat that in all proofs from to we let use the witness . By WI, this would not change the probability that A ′ breaks the protocol, except negligibly, even if A ′ knew all witnesses. In particular, this first hybrid is indistinguishable from the original protocol also for corrupted , as long as and are honest. Consider then the following attack on au . First we set up and : Specifically we let ′ (the key generator for au ) depend on (the key generator for mau ) with ( , ) = ( , ), ( , ) = ( , ). This is clearly a hard generator when is a hard generator. We run the attack against the protocol in au using this ′ . We let A interact with ′ as it would interact with . We get back and and ( , ) ∈{ , } -we can simply discard these last keys. Then we run the protocol au with A, except that we input = ( , ′ ) to and = ( ′ , ) to in the game against au . And in the game against au we send the message to that A sends to and we send the message to that A sends to , and the messages sent by we show to A as if coming from and the messages sent by we show to A as if coming from . It follows by security of au that if accepts then = . I.e., if accepts, then we can assume that ( , ′ ) = ( ′ , ), except with negligible probability. Since accepts a message from only if it accepts and stores ′ , we can conclude that accepts and that therefore ′ = , except with negligible probability. Yet we know that A with probability makes output (accept, ′ ) without giving input ( , ) to . This means that A sends a message ( , , ′ , ) such that ver ( ′ , ) = accept without ever signing ′ under . This can trivially be turned into an attack on the enforceability of the signature scheme under chosen message attack, with success probability negligibly close to 2 . This shows that 2 is negligible, and hence is negligible. Given that au is completely symmetric i.e.
accepts iff accepts, and in this case they both output (accept, ), one can repeat the previous argument by exchanging with to see that the probability that outputs ( , ) when didn't get ( , ) as input is negligible. ◻
Proof of Thm. 4:
The simulator S will extract commitments by inputting = 1 to learn and input to F mcom on behalf of the corrupted sender. It gives the proofs by using the secret of the corrupted sender as witness. The simulator S trapdoor opens the commitment to some ′ simply by sending ′ . Then it gives the proof using the secret of the corrupted receiver as witness. For a proof from an honest party to an honest party it uses no witness: It generates a simulated conversation ( , , ) and then lets the party playing verifier send the challenge . This is done to ensure that S never uses for an honest . To show that this simulation works it is sufficient to show that it generates a view indistinguishable from that of the real protocol.
The indistinguishability follows from WI of the OR-construction and the security of the OT: Starting from the real protocol we can first consider the hybrid where = 0 is still used but the proofs given by the receiver are produced using the secret of the corrupted sender as witness. By WI of the proofs this will not change the output of the environment, except negligibly, or the environment could distinguish between proofs generated with different witnesses. Then we go to a hybrid where the honest receiver uses = 1. By security of the OT, this will not change the output of the environment, except negligibly. This hybrid is now the simulation, except that honest parties output the message ′ to which a commitment is opened, whereas in the simulation F mcom outputs the message which S receives from the OT. It is therefore sufficient to argue that these two messages are the same except with negligible probability. If not, we can run this hybrid and find a commitment where ′ ≠ . Note that in running it, we do not need to use the of an honest party. We then use rewinding on all the proofs given by the sender and extract a witness. Except with negligible probability the extracted witnesses consist of openings of , 0 and 1 to , 0 and 1 such that = commit( ), 0 = commit( 0 ) and 1 = commit( 1 ) and 0 = ′ and the view of the receiver in the OT protocol is consistent with the randomness and inputs 0 and 1 ; if this is not the extracted witness, then the extracted witness contains ′ such that ( , ′ ) ∈ . Since is never used to produce the view of this hybrid distribution, i.e. the hybrid has been executed, rewound and rerun without using ′ , it follows that the witness contains ′ with negligible probability, as is a hard key generator. Therefore the OT protocol is consistent with an execution with input 0 = ′ . By correctness of the OT it therefore follows that = ′ , as is the output of the OT and the selection bit was = 0. ◻ Proof of Thm. 6: The simulator S simulates F crs by sampling = ( ) and giving to A. From F kra it receives for ∈ , where = [ ]∖ and are the indices of the corrupted parties. Then for = 1, . . . , and = 1, . . . , , ≠ it simulates the proofs. If and are both corrupted there is nothing to simulate. If and are both honest S uses 0 = 1 = 0 (where ∶ {0, 1} → {0, 1} ℓ ) and = 0. It simulates all proofs by sampling a simulated conversation ( , , ) using the honest verifier simulator and letting send , send and send . When is corrupted and is honest, then the simulator inputs = 1 to the SA-OT and learns 1 . If the proof succeeds and = ( 1 ), then S inputs 1 to F kra on behalf of , making the output of . If the proof succeeds and ≠ ( 1 ), then S terminates. If the proof fails, then the protocol kra will not give any outputs, so S simply does not deliver the outputs of F kra either. To allow to run with input = 1 it gives the proofs using as witness, which is possible as = ( ). If is honest and is corrupted, then S received from F kra . In the SA-OT it takes 0 = 0 and 1 = and gives the proof using as witness. That the simulation is indistinguishable from the real protocol follows from the computational hiding of the commitment scheme used in proving the execution of the SA-OT consistent, the special honest verifier zero-knowledge of the -protocol (for the honest/honest case), the computational hiding of the OT and WI of the OR-construction. What remains is to show that there is a negligible probability that a corrupted gives acceptable proofs to S and yet ≠ ( 1 ). Consider a pair , where is corrupt, honest and where the proofs of are acceptable and ≠ ( 1 ). Here is controlled by the environment and the adversary. We can take the entire execution of the simulation, including the environment, the adversary and S and rewind all proofs given by to S, and extract a witness for the proof. The witness will include 1 such that = ( 1 ) or = ( 1 ). Since ≠ ( 1 ) it follows that = ( 1 ). Since S is itself using such that = ( ) in its proofs, it is not necessarily a contradiction with the one-wayness of that we can extract 1 such that = ( 1 ) from . We can, however, define an hybrid where S does not use : For each for an honest , we inspect F kra to find such that = ( ).
7 Then we run all honest parties correctly, using the witness in the proofs. By WI of the OR-construction, this will only negligibly change the probability that the extraction of A gives 1 such that = ( 1 ). Now that is not used anymore in the execution, we set to be any given value. But then the expected poly-time process of running the execution and then extracting can take as input and with non-negligible probability output 1 such that = ( 1 ), which contradicts that is a OWF. In proving that when S changes witness, then the witness extracted from the proof of does not change, follows the proof of Thm. 1. For the proof to go through it is important that while is giving its proof, the simulator will not have to simulate any proof of honest parties: by construction of the protocol only and are giving proofs at this phase, and either acts as prover or acts as prover, and never at the same time.
◻ Proof of Lemma 1: Let A ′ be the adversary which runs exactly as A, except that it inputs = ( , , 1− ) to F kra . Since ( ′ ) = ( ), the view of the honest receiver does not change, so it is enough to prove the claim for the case where runs with A ′ . For this purpose, let A ′′ be the adversary which runs exactly as A ′ , except that it samples 1− ∈ {0, 1} +1 uniformly at random. Since A ′′ corresponds to the honest sender, it follows that accepts the commitment when running with A ′′ , and that later accept the opening to . Consequently, the honest will also accept the commitment when running with A ′ , and will later accepts the opening to , or could be used to distinguish 1− = ( 1− ) with 1− ∈ {0, 1} from a uniformly random 1− ∈ {0, 1} +1 . ◻
Proof of Lemma 2:
Note first that we can make sample 1− as 1− = ( 1− ) also when = 0. By being a PRG, this will not change whether the views of when = 0 and = 1 are computationally indistinguishable. Note then that even if we give 1− to (both when = 0 and = 1) we can show that the views when = 0 and = 1 are computationally indistinguishable: then it clearly holds also when is not given 1− . But when is given 1− we can let sample and 1− and send 1− to , instead of the other way around. This is not going to change the view of , only the direction of a message. But now, when = 0, then runs A and runs S. Furthermore, when = 1, then still runs A, but runs the honest . By UC security, A cannot distinguish whether it interacts with S or .
Note that when = 0, we can change the protocol such that samples 1− ∈ {0, 1} +1 uniformly at random and sends it to . This is not going to change the view of , only the direction of a message. Hence it is sufficient to prove the claim for this protocol. We can then change the protocol such that instead samples 1− ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and sends 1− = ( 1− ). By being a PRG, this does not change whether the views of when = 0 and = 1 are computationally indistinguishable. But now is running the honest sender from and is running the honest receiver from . So by being computationally hiding it follows that the views of are computationally indistinguishable when = 0 and = 1. ◻
